Case Summaries – Page 4 – Construction Law

Recent English Court Case on FIDIC – Stay Permitted to Allow Mandatory DAB Referral under FIDIC Silver Book

Jan 14 2015

By Mike Stewart and Camilla de Moraes, K&L Gates, London

Following on from our recent blog post discussing the case of Obrascon Huarte Lain SA v Her Majesty’s Attorney General for Gibraltar [2014] EWHC 1028 (TCC) (which can be found here), there has been another recent decision in the English courts regarding the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) suite of contracts. The case of Peterborough City Council v Enterprise Managed Services Ltd [2014] EWHC 3193 has confirmed that the referral of a dispute to a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) under FIDIC is mandatory and operates as a condition precedent to the dispute being referred to arbitration or litigation for final resolution. The case also discusses the well know “gap” in the provisions of clause 20 of the FIDIC conditions where arbitration is chosen as the final method of dispute resolution.

Facts

Under the terms of the contract, Enterprise Managed Services Ltd (EMS) agreed to design, supply, install, test and commission a 1.5 MW solar energy plant on the roof of a building owned by Peterborough City Council (the “Council”).

The form of contract was the FIDIC General Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (the “Silver Book”). The works were completed in late 2011, and the Council alleged that the plant failed to reach the required output of 55kW. Disputes then arose between the parties as to the value of EMS’s executed work and whether or not liquidated damages were payable to the Council for failure to meet the required output.

On 21 July 2014, EMS gave notice under the contract of its intention to refer the dispute to adjudication. Despite this, on 11 August 2014, the Council issued proceedings. Shortly afterwards, the Council wrote to EMS disputing that it was obliged to refer the dispute to the DAB. On 27 August 2014, EMS issued an application to the court for an order to stay the action brought by the Council.

The Contract

Clauses 20.2–20.7 of the contract set out the procedure for dispute resolution by a DAB to be appointed on an ad hoc basis after any dispute has arisen. Clause 20.8 stated that if at the time a dispute arose there was no DAB in place, “whether by reason of the expiry of the DAB’s appointment or otherwise”, then either party could proceed to litigation.

The Issues

The issues to be decided were:

i) Whether the contract required a dispute to be referred to adjudication by a DAB as a condition precedent to issuing court proceedings; and

ii) If so, should the court exercise its discretion and order that the proceedings commenced by the Council should be stayed?

In relation to the first issue, the Council argued that Clause 20.8 operated as an “opt-out” from DAB adjudication. However, even if such a reference was mandatory, the Council argued that it would be a time consuming, expensive and ultimately unproductive exercise to conduct an adjudication which would almost certainly provoke a notice of dissatisfaction from one or other of the parties, and therefore, a stay should not be granted.

The Decision

In respect of the Council’s argument that Clause 20.8 operated as an ‘opt-out’ from DAB adjudication, the judge held that Clause 20.8 would “probably” only grant the parties a unilateral right to opt out of the DAB adjudication if the parties had agreed to appoint a standing DAB at the outset. This was because an ad hoc DAB would only ever be appointed after a dispute had arisen. Otherwise, Clauses 20.2 and 20.3 would have no application because, under those sub-clauses, there had to be a dispute before the process of appointing a DAB began. Given that Clause 20.2 provided for ad hoc DAB appointments and on the Council’s argument Clauses 20.2–20.7 would have been rendered meaningless, the judge accepted EMS’s argument that the contract required disputes to be resolved by way of DAB adjudication prior to litigation.

As to the Council’s submission that the “rough and ready” process of adjudication was entirely unsuitable to resolve the dispute between the parties, although the judge agreed, he stated that this was an inherent feature of adjudication. The judge, however, referred to the presumption that parties should be left to resolve their disputes in the manner provided for in their contract. He stated that the factors and rival scenarios between the parties were finely balanced, and that the Council had failed to make out a sufficiently compelling case to displace the presumption and, accordingly, had failed to make out a sufficient case for resisting a stay.

It was held that the parties must be left to resolve their dispute in accordance with the contractual mechanism, namely adjudication.

“Gap” in FIDIC Clause 20

As part of its submissions, the Council argued that there is a gap in Clauses 20.4–20.7, such that these clauses should be unenforceable for lack of certainty. This so-called “gap” has been the subject of much commentary.

Clause 20.4 of the FIDIC conditions provides that, where a party gives a notice of dissatisfaction after a DAB decision, then the decision must be given effect to (pending final determination). It is therefore binding, but it is not final and binding. The Council argued that if the unsuccessful party subsequently failed to comply with the DAB’s decision, then the only remedy for the successful party would be to refer the refusal to comply to a DAB. The fact that the unsuccessful party is left without an effective remedy (other than to refer the original dispute to arbitration or litigation) is the “gap” which the Council argued rendered the particular clauses unenforceable.

The judge rejected the Council’s argument that Clauses 20.4–20.7 were unenforceable for lack of certainty. The judge held that although the “gap” point was arguable if the contract contained an arbitration clause, it fell away if litigation was the forum for final dispute resolution. This was because a court could intervene and order specific performance of the obligation to comply with the DAB’s decision (something which an arbitrator may not have jurisdiction to do).

Interestingly, there has been a recent case heard by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court where it was decided that, although the DAB procedure was a condition precedent to arbitration, the parties did not have to go through the process if doing so would amount to an abuse of rights/breach of the principle of good faith. Given that there is no underlying principle of good faith in English law, it would be unlikely if such arguments were deployed before the English courts to rebut the presumption that parties should be left to resolve their disputes in the manner provided for in their contract.

Adjudicator Has No Jurisdiction Because Of “A Very Strong Prima Facie” Case Of Fraudulent Misrepresentation At Appointment Stage

Nov 12 2014

By Mike R. Stewart and Mary E. Lindsay, K&L Gates, London

Eurocom Limited v Siemens PLC

[2014] EWHC 3710 (TCC)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2014/3710.html

It is never easy to resist an action for enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision. Speed and certainty are central tenets to the adjudication mechanism provided by the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. However, the judgment in the recent case of Eurocom Limited v Siemens PLC shows that the courts will not put enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision above basic legal principles.

The dispute arose in relation to a sub-contract allowing for the installation of communication systems in the London Underground. Siemens terminated the sub-contract in August 2012. A first adjudication took place and the decision made on 27 September 2012. That decision provided that a net sum was due from Eurocom to Siemens. Eurocom served a second notice of adjudication on 21 November 2013 and it was that adjudication that gave rise to these enforcement proceedings.

In the enforcement proceedings the judge considered, amongst other things, whether appointment of the second adjudicator was valid.

The adjudicator was appointed under the RICS’s nomination procedure. This required Knowles, acting for Eurocom, to complete a form in which it was asked to identify “any Adjudicators who would have a conflict of interest” in the case (who would not thereby be appointed). A number of adjudicators, the adjudicator in the first adjudication (who might very well and sensibly have been appointed as adjudicator in the second adjudication) and a firm of solicitors were listed in this section of the form. The form was not initially shared with Siemens.

However, it subsequently came to light and it transpired that the adjudicators identified did not in fact have a conflict of interest in the case. Knowles accepted they did not “properly” answer the question asked by the RICS about conflicts of interest, but merely referred to people without any conflicts who they did not want to be appointed.

Siemens’ primary case was as follows:

The application form sent to the RICS by Knowles seeking the appointment of an adjudicator misrepresented to the RICS that a number of individuals had a conflict of interest;
This was a false statement, made deliberately and/or recklessly by Knowles; and
A nomination based upon such a fraudulent misrepresentation is invalid and a nullity, such that the adjudicator has no jurisdiction.

The Court decided the point as follows (at para 65 of the judgment):

“… there is a very strong prima facie case that [Knowles] deliberately or recklessly answered the question “Are there any Adjudicators who would have a conflict in this case?” falsely and that therefore he made a fraudulent representation to the RICS as the adjudicator nominating body.”

The Court said that the consequence of this was as follows (at para 75 of the judgment):

“… I conclude that the fraudulent misrepresentation would invalidate the process of appointment and make the appointment a nullity so that the adjudicator would not have jurisdiction.”

The Court also agreed with Siemens’ alternative case that the completion of the form gave rise to a breach of an implied term to act honestly. Here the Court referred to the judgment in Makers v Camden (at [29(7)]) that there might be an implied term “by which the party seeking a nomination should not suborn the system of nomination”. Eurocom, through its advisors, had sought through fraudulent misrepresentation to influence the discretion to be applied by the appointing body, the RICS. Eurocom should not benefit from this benefit and the appointment of the adjudicator was invalid.

The ramifications of this decision will be keenly monitored by the industry.

High Court Finds No Duty of Care From Builder to Owners Corporation

Oct 22 2014

by Sandra Steele, Belinda Montgomery, Marcel Marquardt, Matthew G. Sier, K&L Gates, Sydney

The High Court has held that a builder of a serviced apartment complex does not owe a duty of care in negligence for financial loss arising from defects in common property to an owner’s corporation (Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 [2014] HCA 36).

The serviced apartments were built by the builder under a design and construction contract with a developer. The owner’s corporation was a subsequent owner of the land.

This is an important decision for the building and construction industry as it has defined the circumstances in which a commercial builder will be found liable for defective works in negligence.

To read the full alert, click here.

Expansion of Statute of Limitations in Illinois under 15th Place Condominium Association v. South Campus Development Team, LLC

Sep 23 2014

By Daniel E. Raymond and Jesse G. Shallcross, K&L Gates, Chicago

General contractors and developers beware—suits for breach of express indemnity now have a longer shelf life in Illinois.

In 15th Place Condominium Association v. South Campus Development Team, LLC, the Appellate Court for First District of Illinois held that a claim for breach of an express indemnity clause contained in a construction contract is subject to a ten-year statute of limitations instead of four.[1] The subject of the dispute was a contract between 15th Place Condominium Association (the “Association”) and South Campus Development Team (the “Developer”) to develop two condominium towers (the “Project”). The Developer contracted with Linn-Mathes, Inc. (the “General Contractor”), who would act as general contractor.[2] The contract between the Developer and the General Contractor included an express indemnity clause and a cause of action accrual provision.[3] By 2003 and 2004, the Project was substantially completed, and, in 2005, the Developer turned over the property to the Association.[4]

Unhappy with the Project, the Association sued the Developer for breach of the implied warranty of fitness and habitability, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence in 2008.[5] In turn, in 2011, the Developer filed a third-party complaint against the General Contractor for breach of express indemnity, among other claims.[6] At the trial level, the General Contractor successfully argued that the Developer’s claim for breach of express indemnity was untimely and barred by the four-year statute of limitations for construction-related claims.[7]

The appellate court, however, disagreed. Relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bowman, the court overturned the trial court and applied the ten-year statute of limitations for contract claims.[8] In Travelers, the Illinois Supreme Court instructed that when determining whether to apply the ten-year statute of limitations for contract claims or the four-year statute of limitations for construction-related claims, courts must look to the nature of the claim—meaning whether the claims emanates from construction-related activity or a contractual obligation.[9] Applying this test to the express indemnity clause at issue, the court determined that the nature of the claim was for failure to indemnify, a contractual obligation, not from any “act or omission relating to construction activity.”[10] Thus, the ten-year statute of limitations applied and the Developer’s claim for breach of express indemnity was not barred by the passage of time.

[1] 2014 IL App (1st) 122292.

[2] Id. ¶¶ 5-7.

[3] Id. ¶ 43.

[4] Id. ¶ 39.

[5] Id. ¶ 7.

[6] Id. ¶ 10.

[7] Id. ¶¶ 17-20.

[8] Id. ¶ 45.

[9] Id. ¶ 46.

[10] Id. ¶ 52.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Subsequent Homeowners Are Not Entitled to Implied Warranty of Habitability

Sep 19 2014

By Christopher A. Barbarisi and Loly G. Tor, K&L Gates, Newark

In Conway v. Cutler Group Inc.,[1] the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Superior Court and held that the builders’ implied warranty of habitability does not run to subsequent purchasers of homes, significantly limiting homebuilders’ potential liability to subsequent owners.

In Conway, the homeowners, Michael and Deborah Conway, purchased a three-year-old home from the original owners, who had purchased the home new from the builder. After allegedly discovering water infiltration and construction defects in the home, the Conways filed suit against the builder for breach of the homebuilders’ implied warranty of habitability. The trial court dismissed the Conways’ complaint, finding that the Conways’ claim for breach of the implied warranty was barred due to lack of privity. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, finding that the implied warranty of habitability should exist independently of a contract between the builder and homeowner because the warranty is based on public policy considerations, is designed to “equalize the disparate positions” of the builder and homeowner, and exists independently of any builder representations.

In reversing the Superior Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the history of the implied warranty of habitability and its adoption by the Court in Elderkin v. Gaster.[2] In Elderkin, the Court rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor and instead placed the burden of risk on a builder “‘that a home which he has built will be functional and inhabitable in accordance with contemporary community standards.’”[3] The Court also recognized that the implied warranty in Elderkin was based on the existence of a contract between the builder and the homeowner (which, of course, does not exist with a subsequent purchaser) and was limited to situations where the parties are not in privity. After discussing the varying decisions reached by courts in other jurisdictions on this issue, the Court declined to depart from its position that the implied warranty of habitability is grounded in contract and requires privity between the parties to be enforced. It concluded that whether to extend the warranty of habitability to subsequent homeowners is a question of public policy properly left to the legislature. Thus, unless and until Pennsylvania’s General Assembly decides otherwise, an action for breach of implied warranty of habitability requires contractual privity between the parties, eliminating a potential source of liability to homebuilders.

[1] J-41-2014 (Pa. Aug. 18, 2014).
[2] 288 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1972).
[3] J-41-2014 at *4 (quoting Elderkin, 288 A.2d at 777).

“2 Sign or Not 2 Sign:” Which Statute of Frauds Governs Oil & Gas Leases?

Jul 16 2014

By George A. Bibikos, K&L Gates, Harrisburg and David I. Kelch, K&L Gates, Pittsburgh

In a recent decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court resolved an open question of state law regarding which one of two alternative statutes of frauds apply to oil and gas leases, in the process making clear that for an oil and gas lease, only the grantor of the interest must sign.

To read the full alert, click here.

No License? No Problem. The Ninth Circuit Holds That Unlicensed Contractors May Maintain Claims For Compensation Under The Miller Act

Jul 02 2014

By Heather W. Habes and Tyler J. Cesar, K&L Gates, Los Angeles

In a matter of first impression in Technica, LLC ex rel. United States v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., No. 12-56539, 2014 WL 1674108 (9th Cir. April 29, 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that California’s contractor’s licensing law, does not bar unlicensed contractors from recovering on Miller Act claims. The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to impose state law limitations on a contractor’s remedies under the federal Miller Act is consistent with prior rulings of the Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. In the interest of uniform enforcement of federal law and the reduction of hurdles to recovery by federal subcontractors, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the prime contractor and its surety.

The underlying dispute arose from work performed in connection with the federal work of improvement located in California on the ICE El Centro SPC – Perimeter Fence Replacement/Internal Devising Fence Replacement (the “Project”). Candelaria Corporation, as prime contractor, secured a payment bond from its surety, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“CCIC”), in connection with the Project. Candelaria’s sub-subcontractor, Technica, LLC (“Technica”) provided almost $900,000 worth of labor, material, and services to the Project, yet only received payments for this work in the amount of $300,000. Technica did not possess a California contractor’s license during its performance of the work at issue. Invoking its rights under the Miller Act to recover the outstanding amounts, Technica filed a complaint in district court against Candelaria and CCIC. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 7031(a), which bars a contractor from recovering compensation for work that was performed without a license, Candelaria and CCIC sought, and were granted, summary judgment of Technica’s claims. Technica appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the purpose of the Miller Act is to provide a remedy to contractors and materialmen denied compensation on federal construction projects. The Miller Act requires a general contractor on a federal project to obtain a payment bond for the benefit of “persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract.” 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(2). Since it is the Miller Act, and not California state law, that provides Technica with a right to recover on the Project, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the scope of this federal remedy should not be conditioned by state law. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit drew upon the holding of the Supreme Court in F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 127 (1974), and other similar Circuit Court decisions. In F.D. Rich, the Supreme Court relied upon the federal interest in uniform application of the law in determining that state law could not be used to provide an award of attorney’s fees to a Miller Act claimant when federal law provides no such right. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 127-28. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. R.J. Studer & Sons, 365 F. 2d 997 (8th Cir. 1966), the Eighth Circuit held that a Colorado law requiring a partnership to record an affidavit with the county recorder’s office was not applicable to the contractor’s Miller Act claim. Likewise, in Hoeppner Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. E.L. Magnum, 287 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960), the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Miller Act is highly remedial, and therefore the contractor’s remedies thereunder should not be limited by a South Dakota statute forbidding enforcement of a contract on behalf of a foreign corporation.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision does not change any current California law. Nonetheless, the decision is significant for its fresh look on the purpose of the Miller Act. Construction counsel should take note that courts may be unwilling to limit the remedies of contractors under the Miller Act in accord with state law requirements.

No Compensation for Clandestine Employment in Germany!

Jun 30 2014

By Christoph Mank and Kristina Fischer, K&L Gates, Berlin

In Germany, it is prohibited by law to hire clandestine workers. But what happens if a principal nevertheless hires a clandestine worker and does not pay the agreed compensation? Is the clandestine worker entitled to claim his compensation before court? In a recent judgment dated 10 April 2014, the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof“) said “no“ and decided that clandestine employment must not be compensated.

The defendant was building serial houses; the plaintiff was instructed by the defendant to do electrical installations. As compensation, plaintiff and defendant had agreed that the defendant would pay a lump-sum of EUR 13,800 including VAT and another EUR 5,000 cash and without invoice. From the agreed amount of EUR 5,000, the defendant had paid EUR 2,300 but refused to pay the remaining EUR 2,700. The claim with which the plaintiff (inter alia) requested payment of these EUR 2,700 was, however, dismissed:

The agreement between the parties, obliging the defendant to pay the cash amount of EUR 5,000, is null and void. According to Section 134 of the German Civil Code, an agreement which violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different conclusion. In this case, the parties´ understanding has violated Section 1 no. 2 (2) of the German Act to Combat Clandestine Employment (“Schwarzarbeitsbekämp-fungsgesetz“), which classifies as clandestine employment the nonfulfilment of statutory tax liabilities. According to the Court, it was evident that the parties´ agreement to provide works without an invoice was meant to conceal the plaintiff´s turnovers from German tax authorities and to provide a price advantage for the defendant. Even if the „cash understanding“ referred to only a part of the agreement, the violation of Section 1 no. 2 (2) of the Act leads to a nullity of the entire agreement. As a consequence, the clandestine worker was not able to claim the agreed compensation from the principal.

What makes the decision of the German Federal Court of Justice particular? In a former decision of 1990, the Court had decided that although the agreement between principal and contractor was violating the (former) Law on Clandestine Employment the contractor was nevertheless entitled to claim restitution according to the value of his work. The Court argued that the principal who mostly is the economically stronger party, would otherwise be in unjust advantage if he was allowed to keep the clandestine worker´s performance without any consideration. Since 1990, the Laws on Clandestine Employment have tightened. Accordingly, in 2013, the Court heralded a change of its case law and ruled that a principal has no warranty claims against a clandestine worker, if the worker´s performance was poor, inadequate or insufficient. With its 2014 decision, the Court emphasized the importance to enforce the Laws on Clandestine Employment effectively: A person who deliberately violates the Law does not deserve to be protected by civil law. By denying the principal´s warranty claims on the one hand and the clandestine worker´s claim for compensation on the other hand, parties shall be restrained from concluding a prohibited clandestine agreement. Whether or not this judgment will have the expected deterrent effect on clandestine contractors and principals remains to be seen.

Federal District Court in Pennsylvania Allows Negligence Suit Against Builder, Despite lack of Privity of Contract Between the Parties

Jun 12 2014

By Kimberly L. Karr, K&L Gates, Pittsburgh

A Federal Court in Pennsylvania has handed down a ruling that may expand the pool of potential plaintiffs in construction litigation. See AMCO Insurance Co. v. Emery and Associates, 926 F. Supp. 2d 634 (W.D. Pa. 2013). In AMCO, the court allowed the second owner of a building and its insurer to file suit for negligence against a builder, even though privity of contract did not exist between the parties. See id. at 643.

The case stems from damage to property in Armstrong County, Pennsylvania. The original owners of a property hired a general contractor, Emery, to build a hotel. The owners then sold the hotel to a second owner. Seven years after that, a fire occurred that caused significant damage to the hotel premises. See AMCO, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 637-38.

The second owner filed a claim with its insurance company, AMCO, to recover the cost of the damage due to the fire. AMCO paid their insured $4 million, and then sued the contractor for the claim amount. Among AMCO’s causes of action was an argument that the builder, Emery, acted negligently when it constructed the hotel. Specifically, AMCO alleged that Emery’s failure to comply with local and state building codes attributed (at least in part) to the fire. See id. at 637-39.

Emery petitioned the Federal District Court to dismiss AMCO’s negligence claim, with one reason being that it owed no duty to the second owner and its insurer. See id. at 642. Emery seemed to rely on the lack of direct relationship between the parties to support its claim. See id. at 642-43.

However, the court disagreed. It held that under Pennsylvania law, a “duty of care” could extend from a builder to a second owner and its insurer, even in the absence of a direct relationship (including privity of contract). Quoting a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision, F.D.P. ex rel. S.M.P. v. Ferrara, 804 A.2d 1221, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2002), the AMCO court weighed five factors to determine whether a duty of care was present: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution. See AMCO, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 643. Applying these factors to Emery, the court ruled that it is reasonable for a builder to assume that a commercial building may have more than one owner, and negligent acts on the part of the builder could affect subsequent owners. The court also emphasized that it is in the public interest to impose a duty on those who are negligent in following required building codes. See id.

Owners, developers, and builders should be mindful of the AMCO decision before starting a construction project in Pennsylvania. If privity of contract is no longer the sole avenue for recovery, parties must consider all potential plaintiffs who might be owed a duty of care.

Unions and Benefit Fund Trustees Not “Subcontractors” Under Lien Law, According to Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Jun 11 2014

By Kimberly L. Karr, K&L Gates, Pittsburgh

On April 17, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that Pennsylvania’s mechanics’ lien law, 49 P.S. § 1101, et seq., does not allow trustees of union benefit funds to bring claims for non-payment as subcontractors against employers and owners. See Bricklayers of W. Pa. Combined Funds Inc. v. Scott’s Dev. Co., Case No. 36 WAP 2012 (Pa. April 17, 2014); Laborers’ Combined Funds of W. Pa. et al. v. Scott’s Dev. Co., Case No. 37 WAP 2012 (Pa. April 17, 2014). The decision reverses the Superior Court, which previously ruled in favor of the unions.

Under the Pennsylvania’s mechanics’ lien law, unpaid subcontractors can record a lien on an owner’s property. See 49 P.S. § 1301. If the primary contractor continues to withhold rightful payment, the subcontractor can foreclose on the lien and force the sale of the property in lieu of compensation. See id. at § 1701.

The question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether unions and benefit fund trustees could qualify as subcontractors under the mechanics’ lien law. The dispute stemmed from construction work performed by members of two unions on a property in Erie County. General contractor J. William Pustelak Inc. hired the unions using collective bargaining agreements. The agreements specified, among other things, that when the general contractor needed bricklayers and/or laborers, it would obtain them from the unions.

After the work in Erie County went unpaid, the unions filed liens against the property owner, Scott’s Development. The unions sought approximately $42,000 in contributions owed to a fund for the workers’ health, welfare, retirement, and fringe benefits. Scott’s Development objected on the grounds that unions and benefit fund trustees were not considered contractors or subcontractors under Pennsylvania’s mechanics’ lien law. The trial judge dismissed the case, but the Superior Court reinstated it on the basis that the statute should be liberally construed.

The Supreme Court ultimately determined that unions and benefit fund trustees could not be considered subcontractors. It reasoned that a “subcontractor” by definition is a person or business “who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract,” as opposed to ordinary laborers. Quoting Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States for Use & Benefit of Calvin Tomkins, 322 U.S. 102, 109 (1944). The court also cited language from the statute’s official legislative comments, which make a similar distinction between subcontractors and employees. Moreover, according to the court, the trustees could not assert that an implied-in-fact subcontract existed, where the trustees’ claims were based on an express collective bargaining agreement.

The Supreme Court also seemed to consider the effect that the Superior Court’s decision would have if sustained. The court determined that if union workers could be considered “subcontractors” under the mechanics’ lien law, private property owners would then be forced to act as guarantors of contractors’ general employment obligations. According to the Supreme Court, the lower court’s decision would effectively create a new class of claimants that would saddle private property owners with an undue increased risk of litigation. Accordingly, union members and laborers in Pennsylvania are left to recover payment through more traditional theories of liability, such as breach of contract.

Catagory:Case Summaries

Facts

The Contract

The Issues

The Decision

“Gap” in FIDIC Clause 20