The Americas – Page 4 – Construction Law

How Are Your Construction Activities Regulated under OSHA’s Final Silica Rule?

Mar 28 2016

By Barry M. Hartman, K&L Gates, Washington, D.C. and Stephen J. Matzura, K&L Gates, Harrisburg

On March 24, 2016, OSHA issued the prepublication version of the final rule regarding occupational exposure to respirable crystalline silica, including one standard for the general industry and maritime, and another standard for construction work (“Final Rule”). The rule applicable to construction work will be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.1153. It becomes effective June 23, with compliance obligations beginning at least a year later (June 23, 2017). The more stringent permissible exposure limit (“PEL”) of 50 μg/m³ and the “action level” of 25 μg/m³are the same as in the proposed rule that OSHA issued in 2013.

The Final Rule essentially creates three categories of construction activities that are regulated differently depending on levels of exposure to respirable silica: (1) activities excluded from regulation; (2) activities listed in Table 1 that are afforded a “safe harbor” from the requirement to conduct an exposure assessment; and (3) activities that require an exposure assessment. Any employers that perform “construction work” – which may also include employers outside of the construction industry – must consider where their activities fall within the construction standard for silica.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds that Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Shield Design Professionals from Liability for Faulty Information Implicitly Represented in Design Documents

Feb 29 2016

By Michael P. Cotton, K&L Gates, Pittsburgh

In its July 8, 2015 opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that design professionals are potentially subject to liability for negligent misrepresentation claims when it is alleged that their design documents negligently included false information via implicit representations. Gongloff Contracting, L.L.C. v. L. Robert Kimball & Associates, Architects & Engineers, Inc., 119 A.3d 1070 (Pa. Super. 2015). In so doing, the Superior Court clarified the scope of Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and found that the Section does not require a design professional to make an explicit negligent misrepresentation of a specific fact for a third party to recover economic damages.

Washington Court of Appeals Confirms Enforceability of Termination-for-Convenience Clauses and Holds that Implied Covenant of Good Faith Places No Limits on Express Termination-for-Convenience Clauses

Jan 14 2016

By D.C. Wolf, Brad Lewis, and Jesse O. Franklin, K&L Gates, Seattle

The contract law concept of a “termination for convenience” allows one contracting party to terminate a contract that has become inconvenient or unnecessary and settle with the terminated party for partial performance. The doctrine originated during the U.S. Civil War to give the Union government flexibility when quickly changing battlefield conditions rendered a planned project or procurement overly costly or no longer necessary.[1]

In its recent decision in SAK & Associates, Inc. v. Ferguson Construction, Inc., No. 72258-1-1, 2015 WL 4726912 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, given very limited existing authority, clarified that partial performance of a construction project is sufficient consideration to support a termination-for-convenience clause and rejected the argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing limits a party’s ability to invoke such a clause.

New Jersey Appellate Court Holds That Coverage Exists for Consequential Damages Caused By Subcontractors’ Defective Work

Nov 23 2015

By Denise N. Yasinow, Loly G. Tor, and Christopher A. Barbarisi, K&L Gates, Newark

This past summer, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division issued a favorable decision for owners, real estate developers, and general contractors regarding insurance coverage for damages caused by the faulty work of their subcontractors. In Cypress Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, LLC,[1] the Court held that unexpected and unintended consequential damages caused by a subcontractor’s defective work constitutes “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy. Thus, these types of consequential damages are recoverable.

The Cypress Point decision roundly rejected the Third Circuit’s opinion in Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Parkshore Development Corp.,[2] which concluded that faulty workmanship performed by a contractor or a subcontractor that causes damage to the general contractor’s work is not an “occurrence.”

Materials Available: EPC Contracting Issues in the Oil & Gas Industry

Nov 11 2015

K&L Gates and Marsh recently co-sponsored a one-day, complimentary seminar titled “EPC Contracting Issues in the Oil & Gas Industry.”

The seminar featured six hour-long sessions, including a luncheon presentation by Robert Peterson, senior partner at Oliver Wyman, and an industry roundtable review panel consisting of industry experts from Exxon Mobil, Phillips 66, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Fluor, and Aker Solutions.

More than 100 representatives from leading energy companies attended the seminar at the JW Marriott Houston Downtown.

Houston partners Randel Young and John Sullivan III, Pittsburgh partners Richard Paciaroni and Jason Richey, London partner Matthew Smith, Washington, D.C. partner Steven Sparling, and Dallas partner Beth Petronio, along with Pittsburgh associate Jackie Celender, presented during the seminar.

Seminar materials can be found here.

Illinois Now Allows Bonding Off of Mechanics Liens on Private Projects

Oct 15 2015

By Jesse G. Shallcross, K&L Gates, Chicago

On July 29, 2015, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed into law an amendment to the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act which allows a property owner, contractor or other party with an interest in real property which is subject to a mechanics lien claim filed against the property by an aggrieved contractor, subcontractor or material supplier on a private project to substitute a surety bond for such mechanics lien claim.[1] The new law is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2016.

Illinois now joins the ranks of no less than 35 other states that provide for the right of an interested party to substitute a surety bond for real property against which a mechanics lien claim is filed, also known as “bonding off” a mechanics lien claim, on private projects.

Harris v. West Bay Builders: Award of Attorney’s Fees Not Mandatory Under California Prompt Payment Statutes

Oct 01 2015

By Timothy L. Pierce and Hector H. Espinosa, K&L Gates, Los Angeles

California’s prompt payment statutes, found at Business and Professions Code section 7108.5 and Public Contract Code sections 7107 and 10262.5, each contain a fee-shifting provision, stating that the prevailing party “shall” be entitled to his or her attorney’s fees and costs. In James L. Harris Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. West Bay Builders, Inc. (No. C072169), the California Court of Appeals confirmed that a trial court can, in its discretion, choose not to award either party attorney’s fees under the prompt payment statutes if the trial court determines that neither party “prevailed.”

FTR v. Rio: Penalties Assessed Against School District for Withholding Contractor Funds

Sep 24 2015

By Timothy L. Pierce and Benjamin Kussman, K&L Gates, Los Angeles

In East West Bank v. Rio School District, 235 Cal. App. 4th 742 (2015), the California Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s assessment of $1,537,404.96 in statutory penalties against the Rio School District (the “District”) for the District’s failure to timely release contractor funds pursuant to Public Contract Code Section 7107. The Court concluded, in what constitutes a departure from another recent Court of Appeals ruling interpreting the same statutory provision[1], that Section 7101 does not allow a public entity to withhold contractor retainage on the basis of a dispute over the cost of contract work.

State v. Perini: New Jersey Supreme Court Has Its Say on Statute of Repose

Jul 23 2015

By Denise N. Yasinow, Christopher A. Barbarisi, and Loly G. Tor, K&L Gates, Newark

Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court shed some new light on an old question impacting construction claims, i.e., when does the statute of repose commence? In New Jersey, the statute of repose[1] bars actions “arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property” that are brought “more than 10 years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.”[2] In State v. Perini Corporation,[3] the Court examined the question in the context of a claim involving an improvement that serviced a larger, phased construction project. The Supreme Court affirmed, as modified, the Appellate Division’s decision,[4] holding that the statute of repose did not commence until the date of substantial completion of the entire overall phased project. Read More

“Badges” of Fraud Allow a Construction Contractor to Pierce the Corporate Veil of an Insolvent Developer and Hold the Principals Personally Liable

Apr 20 2015

By Jesse G. Shallcross, K&L Gates, Chicago

In a recent decision from the 1st District Appellate Court of Illinois, A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc. v. Burnham Partners, LLC, defendants husband and wife were held personally liable for roughly $450,000 due to unpaid construction work performed under contract with the limited liability company controlled by the couple.

Robert Halpin owned defendant Burnham Partners, LLC (“Burnham”), a real estate development company with a 90 percent stake in defendant Westgate Ventures, LLC (“Westgate”), and Halpin’s wife, Lori, ran the bookkeeping for both companies. Westgate engaged plaintiff A.G. Cullen Construction, Inc. (“Cullen”) to build a warehouse and distribution facility in Big Beaver, Pennsylvania.

During the course of construction, Westgate refused to approve one of Cullen’s payment requests for work performed, and Cullen took the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Cullen $448,406.87 for the unpaid work and associated expenses and penalties, and the award was reduced to a judgment in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

Shortly before the arbitration hearing, Westgate sold the project and Halpin began winding up Westgate’s affairs and liquidating its assets, using the proceeds of the sale to pay other creditors. He also paid a $400,000 developer’s fee to Burnham and transferred roughly $97,500 to himself and his wife, leaving a zero balance in the operating account of Westgate and no means with which to pay the Pennsylvania judgment.

Cullen filed suit in Cook County, Illinois against Westgate, Burnham and the Halpins to recover the amount owed by Westgate on the Pennsylvania judgment. In attempting to hold Burnham and the Halpins liable for Westgate’s debts, Cullen argued that Burnham, through Halpin, perpetrated a fraud by transferring all of Westgate’s assets to themselves and other creditors. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, however, finding that Cullen failed to present “undisputed evidence” of fraud.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled in favor of Cullen, finding that the activity of the defendants presented nine of the 11 factors or “badges of fraud” set forth in the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) (740 ILCS 160/5) which give rise to an inference or presumption of fraud:

There was a transfer of funds to a company “insider”, which term includes individuals who control the company and the relatives of such individuals, such as Robert and Lori Halpin.
The action of transferring assets out of Westgate was concealed from Cullen.
The transfer of Westgate’s assets to Burnham served to remove or conceal the assets themselves from Cullen.
Before any of the transfers occurred, Cullen’s demand for arbitration had put the defendants on notice of a threatened lawsuit.
Substantially all of Westgate’s assets were transferred.
Westgate did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for (a) its payment of a $400,000 development fee to Burnham or (b) its repayment of a $120,000 “loan” from the Halpins, the original payment of which, the court found, should have been a capital contribution from Burnham to Westgate under the terms of the company operating agreement.
Westgate became insolvent after the transfers.
The transfers occurred just 10 months after Cullen’s demand for arbitration and two months before the arbitration award was entered.
Westgate had transferred assets to Burnham, a lienor, and Burnham then transferred those assets to the Halpins, who were insiders.

The court found that the defendants’ transfers of Westgate’s assets to themselves and other unsecured creditors when they knew about Westgate’s potential liability to Cullen amounted to fraud in violation of the UFTA.

While this finding of fraudulent activity of the defendants was a victory for Cullen, it did not necessarily follow that each of the defendants would be held personally liable for the obligations of Westgate to pay Cullen. This is because a company is ordinarily treated as a separate legal entity, the debts and liabilities of which its shareholders or principals are not responsible for.

However, the common law system has developed a legal doctrine by which the principal of a company may be held liable for the debts and obligations of the company. Where the principal has, for example, treated the company as a mere “alter ego”, failed to obey corporate formalities, or engaged in fraudulent activity, courts may “pierce” or “lift” the corporate veil to hold the principals liable for the actions of the company.

Under Illinois law, efforts to pierce the corporate veil of a company are governed by the law of its state of incorporation. As Westgate was a Delaware limited liability company, the court applied Delaware law, which states that the corporate veil may be pierced where there is fraud. The presence of nine of the 11 “badges of fraud” was enough to convince the court that the defendants had engaged in fraud. As a result, the court ruled that Cullen may pursue each of Burnham and the Halpins for the $457,416.37 Pennsylvania judgment against Westgate.

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